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PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Gary HATFIELD
REsUME: La psychologie, en tant que science naturelle, prend sa source dans la
« physique» ou «philosophie naturelle » aristotelicienne de l'ame. c. Wolff a situ«
la psychologie sous le regime de la metaphysique; au meme niveau que la cosmo-
logie. Les penseurs ecossais l'ont inregreeala philosophie morale, mais ont distin-
gue ses lois «physiques» des lois morales proprement dites (qui visent Ii regler la
conduite}. Plusieurs penseurs allemands ont cherche Ii la fonder comme branche
autonome de fa science naturelle empirique. En Grande-Bretagne et en France. les
theoriciens de fa vision ont developpe des theories de la perception de la grandeur
et de la distance d'une grande precision mathematique; quelques-uns d'entre eux
ant construit des instruments pour mettre al'epreuve ces theories et mesurer des
phenomenes tels que fa duree des impressions visuelles. Ces investigateurs etaient
pour la plupart des dualistes qui incluaient les phenomenes mentaux dans la nature.
Let us agree that "psychology" may be defined as the science of the
mind, and that this science studies a domain of phenomena that includes
sense perception, imagination, memory, understanding or reasoning, fee-
ling, and will ', If we then interpret the term "natural science" as it was
understood in the early modem period, psychology considered as a natural
science already had a long history as the eighteenth century began. The
prescribed domain of subject-matter was investigated by Aristotle under
the name "logon peri tes psyches", of which it formed a proper part. This
Aristotelian discipline was widely studied and taught in the early modem
period under the title "de anima", or, with increasing frequency, "psycho-
J. "Psychology" was so defined in major textbooks into the 19205: George Trumbull
LADD, Psychology. Descriptive and Explanatory, New York, Scribner's Sons, 1895, p. 1-2;
William JAMES, Psychology (Briefer Course), New York, Holt & Co., 1892, p. 1; Harvey
A. CARR, Psychology: A Study of Mental Activity, New York/London, Longmans, Green &
Co., 1925, p. 1. Also, Theodule RIBOT, La Psychologie anglaisecontemporaine, 3rd ed., Paris,
F. Alcan, 1896, p. 42.
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logia" 2. Aristotelian textbooks of philosophy placed the study of the soul,
including the rational soul and intellect, under the rubric of physics or natu-
ral science, together with the study of basic physical principles, body in
general, and the heavens 3. Although the "new philosophers" of the seven-
teenth century uniformly rejected (in their various ways) the Aristotelian
theory of the soul as the substantial form of the body, they did not always
deviate from the Aristotelian conception of physics as the science of nature
in general, including the human mind. As the eighteenth century opened,
then, it was an academic commonplace that the science of the mind or soul
belongs to physics or the science of nature.
Eighteenth-century writers made many proposals for changing or newly
founding the study of the human mind. A few contended that the study of
the mind could not be made sufficiently rigorous to rank as a science 4. The
most famous was Kant, though he nonetheless put empirical psychology
under the rubric of physics (physiologia) and remained committed to the
applicability of the law of cause to all psychological phenomena5. But a
large number of authors, British, Swiss, and especially German, proposed
and sought to practice an "experimental" - that is, an "empirical" and
"observational" - "science of the mind", a scientific psychology. This
activity was surveyed by F. A. Cams in his Geschichte der Psychologie of
1808, in which he discussed more than 125 eighteenth-century authors,
mostly German, but also British, French, Swiss, Italian, Spanish, and Swe-
dish, who wrote psychological works of some type, the majority placing
psychology under the rubric of natural science 6.
2. Otto CASMANN, Psychologia anthropologica, sive animae humanae doctrina, Hannover,
apud G. Antonium, impensis P. Fischeri, 1594; Rudolph GocLENIUS, Psychologia : hoc est, de
hominis perfectione, animo, Marburgh, ex officina Egenolphi, 1590; Fortunio LICETI, Psycho-
logia anthropine, sive de ortu animae humanae, Frankfurt-am-Main, ex officina Joannis Sau-
rii, 1606. On psychology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Paul MENGAL, "Nais-
sances de la psychologie: la nature et I'esprit", Revue de synthese, this issue, p. 355-373.
3. Pierre BARBAY, In universam Aristotelis philosophiam introductio, 6th ed., Paris, apud
Ludovicum Josse, 1700, "Compendii physici", pt. 2, tr. 2, a. 3; Franco BURGERSPUCK, Colle-
gium physicum, disputationibus XXXII, Oxford, typis W. Hall, impensis Joseph Godwin,
1664, disp. 20-31; Eustace of ST. PAUL, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, Koln, typis Phi-
lippi Alberti, 1638, pt. 3, "Physica", tr. 3, disp. 3-4, p. 228-308. The Aristotelian concept of
soul (psyche, anima) extends to vegetative and nutritive, as well as sensory and intellectual,
powers and capacities.
4. Julius B. von ROHR, Unterricht von der Kunst, der menschen Gemuther zu erforschen,
Leipzig, Verlegts Johann Christian Martini, 1721; Charles de SECONPAT, baron de MONTES-
QUIEU, De l'esprit des loix, Geneva, Barrillot, 1748, bk. I, chap. I, p. 3-5.
5. Gary HATFIELD, "Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as
Science and as Philosophy", in Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul GUYER, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 200-227.
6. Friedrich A. CARUS, Geschichte der Psychologie, Leipzig, lA. Barth und P.G. Kummer,
1808, p. 522-760. A century later, Max DESSOIR stressed the prominence of psychology in the
eighteenth century, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie, 2nd ed., Berlin, Carl
Duncker, 1897-1902, p. 358.
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This description of psychology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries contradicts the received historiography. Recent general histories of
psychology agree that natural-scientific psychology arose only in the
second half of the nineteenth century 7. Some historians, taking their cue
from this historiography, have sought to explain why psychology did not
arise in the previous centuries 8. Only a few recent studies treat the earlier
calls for a "natural scientific" psychology as anything but empty rhetoric 9.
And I have found no recent author who acknowledges that psychology was
considered a natural science as the eighteenth century opened and that it
had been so considered in Europe for several centuries.
The contradiction between my description of eighteenth-century psycho-
logy and the traditional historiography arises partly from differing under-
standings of the concepts psychology and natural science. In the past half-
century there has been a decided tendency to equate "natural scientific psy-
chology" with "quantitative, experimental psychology", and to contrast the
"scientific" character of this psychology with the "metaphysical" character
of its earlier namesake. This tendency is not surprising: the growth of psy-
chology as a scientific discipline has been built on its claim to apply quan-
titative experimental rigor to subject-matters about which philosophers and
metaphysicians only talked and speculated. If one equates modem science
with quantitative science, then there could be no scientific psychology prior
to the widespread adoption of quantitative experimental techniques in the
period after 1850. If one confines modem science to its non-metaphysical
moments, then metaphysically inclined theorists and experimentalists must
be excluded, or else only a "sanitized" version of their work allowed in.
These two constraints on legitimacy conjointly explain why the great body
of eighteenth-century literature claiming to found a natural scientific psy-
chology has been largely ignored by historians of psychology.
The equation of natural science with anti-metaphysical, quantitative
experimentation is problematic on two counts. As an approach to history, it
7. Edwin G. BORING, History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed., New York, Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1950; Duane P. SCHULTZ and Sydney Ellen SCHULTZ, History ofModern Psy-
chology, San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987; Richard LoWRY, Evolution ofPsycho-
logical Theory, 2nd ed., New York, Aldine Publ, Co., 1982; Daniel N. ROBINSON, Intellectual
History of Psychology, rev. ed., New York, Macmillan Publ, Co., 1981.
8. E.g., Graham RICHARDS, "The Absence of Psychology in theEighteenth Century: A Lin-
guistic Perspective", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 23, 1992, p. 195-211.
9. Christopher Fox, "Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology: Some Problems and Pers-
pectives", in Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Christopher Fox, New
York, AMS Press, 1987, p. 1-22; Rolf JESCHONNEK, introduction to the reprint edition of
CARUS'S Geschichte, BerlinlNew York, Springer Verlag, 1990, p. 17-37; Eckart SCHEERER,
"Psychologie", in Historisches Wonerbuch der Philosoph ie, ed. Joachim Rrrma, Basel,
Schwabe, 1971-,1. VII, col. 1599·1653; Fernando VIDAL, "Psychology in the 18th Century",
History of the Human Sciences. 6, 1993, p. 89-119. Now joined by P. MENOAL, art. cit. supra,
n.2.
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partakes of the worst failings of "presentist" and "Whig" history: it ignores
the self-understanding of earlier figures who considered themselves practi-
tioners of natural science, and it redescribes their cognitive activity and
intellectual products from the standpoint of the presently ruling party, in
this case, the community of experimental psychologists and their historians
and apologists. Philosophically, it makes a crude positivist assumption that
all progress in science is progress in the quantitative description of natural
phenomena. This philosophical position should be resisted: not all natural
scientific achievements are fundamentally quantitative, including achieve-
ments in two sciences that are closely related to psychology, physiology
and biology (consider the discovery of neurons, or the early development
of the theory of evolution). Moreover, in the early history of physics an
important role was played by conceptual innovation as opposed to quantita-
tive prediction or modeling, as exemplified in Descartes' contribution to
the development of the concept of a unified celestial and terrestrial physics,
(metaphysically) grounded on a small set of basic concepts, laws, and pat-
terns of explanation 10. One should not rule out the possibility that in psy-
chology, too, important conceptual work preceded quantitative experi-
mentation.
A. CONTEXTUAL1ST APPROACH TO THE ORIGIN
OF "NATIJRAL SCIENTIFIC" PSYCHOLOGY
During the eighteenth century, as in the seventeenth, "psychology" was
the science of mind or soul. or of mental phenomena; as such, it was
known under many names, deriving from "psyche", "anima", "soul",
"mind", and their cognates ll. Mind and soul were often, but not always,
equated. The mind or soul was considered by many to be a natural being, a
thing in nature [2. "Science" was applied to any systematic body of thought,
lO. I. B. COHEN, Newtonian Revolution, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980,
p. 182-189; G. HATFIElD, "Metaphysics and the New Science", in Reappraisals of the Scienti-
fic Revolution, ed, David LINDBERG and Robert WESTMAN, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1990, p. 93-166.
11. Many historical investigations, including Vidal's helpful "Psychology in the Encyclo-
pedias", have focused on the origin of the word "psychology", as opposed to the origin of psy-
chology as a discipline. But the aetiology of concepts must be distinguished from the (allied)
histories of word usage. The science of the mind was known under many titles in the eight-
eenth century, including "the science of the mind", "the theory of mind", "psychology", "psy-
chologie", "Psychologic", and "Seelenlehre", Related disciplines included "anthropology", or
the "science of Man", differing instances of which paid greater or lesser attention to human
mental life, and "pneumatics", "pneumatology", or "Geisterlehre", which considered spirits
(immaterial beings).
12. Even a Cartesian could include the study of the soul under the rubric of "physics" :
Antoine LE GRAND, Institutio philosophiaesecundum principiade RenatiDescartes, London,
J. Martyn, 1678, praecognoscenda, a.7, 15, 16.
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and need not have connoted an empirical basis. "Natural science" was
equated with "physics", in the etymological sense of that term; it was the
science of nature 13. In the seventeenth and throughout much of the eight-
eenth centuries this science included the whole of nature, comprising a
subject-matter that we would now range under the headings of physics,
physical astronomy, chemistry, biology, physiology, and psychology.
Given these understandings of the terms and the areas of study they
denote, psychology was considered by a great many eighteenth century
authors to be a science. This was so whether psychology was treated as a
science of mental phenomena or of mental substance. Many considered it
to be a natural science based on experience, including those who consider-
ed themselves to be studying an immaterial substance. A minority of the
latter group followed Christian Wolff in placing psychology under the
rubric of metaphysics rather than physics. This fact, however, requires
careful interpretation, for Wolff also placed cosmology (general physics,
including planetary astronomy and the laws of motion) under metaphysics,
and he allowed that metaphysical principles could and should be esta-
blished empirically 14. Thus, if one takes eighteenth-century conceptions of
psychology seriously across the board, as I intend to do, one is committed
to allowing immaterial substances as a (putative) object of empirical study.
This last observation, even cushioned as it is by the surrounding contex-
tualist historical methodology, is likely to shock modem sensibilities. This
shock is another manifestation of our use of present standards (and mytho-
logies) to judge past materials. Immaterial substances are not in the list of
likely theoretical posits in current psychology and physiology. One way of
interpreting this fact is to think that such posits were part of a religious
world view that was overcome with the Enlightenment rejection of super-
stition and authority. "Reason", so the story often goes, has shown us that
dualism and other mind-positing ontologies are empty or incoherent.
This way of understanding the Enlightenment and the dictates of reason
is itself unreflective and simplistic. It is true that some Enlightenment "phi-
losophes" are justly portrayed as rejecting God and the soul on rational
grounds, in opposition to tradition and authority. But one should not leap to
13. For eighteenth-century definitions (explicit and implicit) of the terms marked by quota-
tion in this paragraph, see Ephraim CHAMBERS, Cyclopaedia, or An Universal Dictionary of
Arts and Sciences, 2nd ed., London, D. Midwinter, 1738; Immanuel KANT, Kntik der reinen
Yemunft, Riga, Hartknoch, 178111787, .. Methodenlehre ", pt. 3 (Kant uses the Latin term
"physiologia" for the science of nature).
14. Christian WOLFF, Philosophia rationalis sive logica, 3rd ed., Frankfurt-am-Main/Leip-
zig, prostat in Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1740: philosophical cognition requires "histori-
cal" cognition of facts (§ 50) and metaphysics is a species of philosophy (§ 79). Further, psy-
chology is a part of metaphysics, and it requires cognition of facts from experience in both its
empirical and rational branches: Psychologia empirica, new ed., Frankfurt-am-MainlLeipzig,
prostat in Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1738, § 1-4.
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the converse conclusion, for it is not true that all those who posited imma-
terial substances were blind followers of tradition and authority. Indeed, a
chief characteristic of many who were metaphysical realists about the soul
was their appeal to reason or intellect in establishing their ontologies : Des-
cartes is the most notorious example. In any event, if one believes that
immaterial entities exist and that some of them inhabit human bodies. it
makes good sense to seek to determine the powers and capacities of such
substances empirically, by studying the manifestation of the mind in the
behavior of others and in one's own experience of mental phenomena.
From this point of view, taking an empirical approach to immaterial sub-
stances is an extremely rational undertaking. How else is one to determine
their powers 15?
When viewed contextually, psychology as a natural science was not
invented in the nineteenth or even the eighteenth century; but during the
eighteenth century it was altered from its seventeenth-century form. As the
eighteenth century opened the science of the mind included several dimen-
sions : charting the "faculties" - the capacities and powers - of mind was
foremost, but there also were metaphysical questions about the ontology of
the mind and its faculties, and about their relation to body and to specific
bodily organs, especially the brain. As the century proceeded, the study of
the mind was displaced from its subdisciplinary status in the Aristotelian
curriculum and pursued along several lines, including explicitly Christian
apologetical approaches to the soul, and the diametrically opposed material-
ism of the philosophes and their Scottish counterparts - including Diderot,
d'Holbach, Helvetius, Priestley, and Bentham - which has received the
most attention in histories of Enlightenment psychology, as part of the
usual story of the Enlightenment banishment of spirits and the alliance of
materialism with progressive thought and politics [6. Between these two
extremes lay the largest and richest body of literature, that of the manifold
programs for adopting an empirical approach to mind and its relation to
body. Such programs were pursued in various disciplinary matrices, in-
15. Aristotelians also quite reasonably took an empirical attitude toward the powers of the
soul, considered as an animating principle. A similar point might be made about the study of
an immaterial supreme being; hence, the extensive practice of "natural theology" during the
eighteenth century. There is a tension between characterizations of the Enlightenment as "The
Age of Reason" and as anti-clerical and secular. "Enlightenment" has two distinct connota-
tions, one based on cognitive attitude or "method", another on content and conclusion. Accor-
ding to the first, it means "thinking for one's self', to the second, it includes rejection of the
immaterial beings posited in many religions. Tension arises because supreme rationalists such
as Descartes and Leibniz "thought for themselves" and claimed to establish the existence of
God and the soul through reason. This apparent conflict should, I think, serve to sensitize us to
the changing content assigned to reason or "the rational" in the modern period.
16. Simon SCHAFFER, "States of Mind: Enlightenment and Natural Philosophy", in Lan-
guages of Psyche, ed. George S. ROUSSEAU, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, Universtity of
California Press, 1990, p, 233-290.
G. HATFIELD: PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE 381
eluding the newly founded and widely influential Wolffian matrix in Ger-
many; the "science of the mind" allied with Scottish moral philosophy; the
proposal of a "natural history" of mind (and of Man) by the prominent
Swiss naturalist Charles Bonnet; and treatments of mind in the established
contexts of medical physiology and the theory of vision. The faculty-based
approach dominated the most prevalent form of dualistic psychology, the
avowedly non-metaphysical Erfahrungsseelenlehre. An alternative to
faculty psychology began to be widely discussed in the middle of the eight-
eenth century: the associationist theory of mind propounded by Hartley,
Hume, and others, which attempted to explain all or most phenomena of
mind by appeal to a few laws of association (usually three).
A detailed road map through this diverse material cannot be attempted
here; I aim instead to sketch the three most visible empirical approaches to
the mind and to determine their self-ascribed disciplinary locations. The
three are: Wolffian psychology, Scottish sciences of Man, and German
Erfahrungsseelenlehre.
THE WOLFFIAN DISCIPLINARY CONTEXT FOR PSYCHOLOGY
Christian Wolff created the paired disciplines of empirical and rational
psychology, which he ordered coordinately with ontology, cosmology, and
natural theology under metaphysics 17. His efforts have been the butt of
many jokes in the history of psychology, most notably of Wundt's famous
jest that Wolff s rational psychology "contains about as much experience
as the empirical, and the empirical about as much metaphysics as the ratio-
nal" 18. In the standard historiography, Wolff is part of the metaphysical
past of psychology's prehistory. His work is paradigmatic of the allegedly
regressive tendencies of pre-scientific, speculative or metaphysical psycho-
logy: it is organized around the study of mental faculties, and it adopts a
realistic attitude toward the soul considered as an immaterial substance.
In the context of the eighteenth century, however, Wolffian empirical
psychology was a progressive research program. It was novel in both
content and methodology. Its major methodological innovation was the
explicit enjoinder to adopt an empiricist attitude toward mental faculties
and phenomena: they were to be studied by attending to their operations,
17. See Philosophia rationalis, op. cit. supra n. 14, § 79; see also Alexander Gottlieb
BAUMGARTEN, Metaphysica, 7th ed., Halle, C. H. Hemmerede, 1779.
18. Wilhelm WUNDT, Grundzlige der physiologischen Psychologie, 3rd ed., Leipzig,
W. Engelmann, 1887, p. 7. .
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while holding metaphysical speculation in abeyance. The facts thus attain-
ed are then examined within rational psychology, in order to determine
appropriate explanatory (we would say "theoretical") principles 19, Within
this scheme, the description of mental faculties is not intended to be expla-
natory (as was the dormitive virtue portrayed in Moliere's joke), but des-
criptive of a unified capacity of the mind. Such descriptions, being classifi-
catory, are not atheoretical; but because they were not intended to be
explanatory, they are not subject to Moliere's joke (any more than are
current psychological investigations of cognitive and perceptual capaci-
ties) 20. Within his empiricist program, Wolff claimed that psychological
states, and particularly those pertaining to pleasure and pain, are subject to
quantitative measurement and mathematical laws, although he did not him-
self formulate a calculus of pleasure. He also suggested that the goodness
of one's memory can be estimated by the temporal latency of response to a
memory demand, from the number of tries it takes to retrieve from
memory, and from the number of acts it takes to fix an item in memory. He
suggested a corresponding quantitative estimate for the size of memory 21.
In content, the Wolffian psychology was noteworthy for its analysis and
discussion of the faculties of imagination, attention, and reflection. Wolff
distinguished imagination proper, which simply reproduces sensory mate-
rials, from .the faculty of "feigning" or producing new representations
ifacultas jingendi). He described the "law of imagination", a law of asso-
ciation through simultaneity. And he discussed attention and its subspecies,
"reflection" (or attention to the content of one's perceptions), including
impediments to their exercise 22,
The Wolffian system was widely influential in Germany, where it displa-
ced the fading Aristotelian and Cartesian school philosophies. Numerous
textbooks of Wolffian philosophy came off the presses, and they were used
even by authors who no longer subscribed to their precepts, including
19. C. WOU-r, Psychologia empirica, op. cit. supra n. 14, § 1-4; Psychologia rationalis,
newed., Frankfurt-am-Main/Leipzig, prostat inOfficinaLibrariaRengeriana, 1740. § 1-3.For
English translation anddiscussion, see Robert J. RICHARDS. "ChristianWolff's Prolegomena to
. Empirical and Rational Psychology; Translation andCommentary", Proceedings of theAme-
rican Philosophical Society. 124, 1980, p.227-239.
20. Jerry FODOR jocuJarly defends faculty psychology in his Modularity of Mind, Cam-
bridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1983. More seriously, the organization of psychology text-
books has long born the stamp of the traditional division of faculties. as psychologists have
studied the functionally characterized faculties of cognition, including perception, learning,
and memory, andmorespecificcapacities,suchas visualperception, andwithinvision,color,
shape, and motion perception.
21. C. WOLPF, Psychologia empirica, op. cit. supra n. 14, § 190-194.
22. Ibid., pt. 1, sec. 2, chap. 3-4; sec. 3, chap. I ; Psychologia rationalis, op. cit. supra
n. 19, pt. 1, sec.T, chap.3-4.
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Immanuel Kant". The system was also rendered into French by the Berlin
Wolffian, Jean Deschamps 24.
SCOTIISH SCIENCES OF MAN AND MIND
In the Scottish Universities of the first half of the eighteenth century the
mind was studied in three areas of the revised Aristotelian curriculum:
logic, metaphysics, and moral philosophy (which discussed appetite). By
mid century, a peculiarly Scottish phenomenon had occurred: within the
university arts curriculum, the study of the mind in general became the spe-
cial preserve of moral philosophy (as might be expected of the "moral
sense" school). Thomas Reid, professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow,
transformed moral philosophy into the examination of the "powers" of the
mind. At Edinburgh, when Adam Ferguson became professor of moral phi-
losophy and pneumatics in 1764, he answered to his title by making the
''theory of mind" a proper part of his basic textbook, the Institutes ofMoral
Philosophy 25.
The fact that the study of the mind fell largely under moral philosophy in
the Scottish arts curriculum does not imply that the mind was considered to
be distinct from nature or from natural scientific methods of study and
modes of explanation. Indeed, it was characteristic of Scottish philosophers
to adopt a naturalistic attitude toward the mind and its powers. Hume
signaled his naturalistic intentions in the subtitle to his Treatise of Human
Nature .. Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method ofReason-
ing into Moral Subjects; in the introduction, he explicitly compared his
methods and modes of explanation to those of Newton 26. Ferguson, in his
telegraphic Institutes ofMoral Philosophy, formulated natural laws of both
matter and mind, distinguishing the latter from properly moral laws. He
defined moral philosophy as "the knowledge of what ought to be", and
declared that "pneumatics, or the physical history of mind, is the founda-
tion of moral philosophy". The term "physical" is not used here to
23. Among the many Wolffian textbooks, Kant is known to have taught from A. G. BAUM-
GARTEN'S Metaphysica, op. cit. supra n. 17.
24. Jean DESCHAMPS, Cours abrege de la philosophie wolffienne, Leipzig/Amsterdam, Ark-
stee & Merkus, 1743-1747.
25. Thomas REID, On the Active Powers ofMan, Edinburgh, 1. Bell, 1788. Adam FERGU-
SON, Institutes ofMoral Philosophy, 2nd ed., Edinburgh, A. Kincaid & W. Creech and J. Bell,
London, S. Crowder, 1773, pt, 2.
26. London, 1739-1740. Besides Hume, Hartley, Reid, and Ferguson adopted "Newtonian"
approaches to mind: Gladys BRYSON, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eight-
eenth Century, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945, p. 18-21, 138-139, 145.
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announce a physicalist or reductionist theory of mind; rather, it is used to
mean "any general expression of a natural operation, as exemplified in a
number of cases". The natural laws of mind were named "physical" by Fer-
guson in order to contrast them with the moral laws that serve to guide
conduct 27. Examples of the former "laws" include the facts that we are
conscious of our "existence, operation, and will", and that perception takes
place via media that do not resemble the object of perception 28.
ERFAHRUNGSSEELENLEHRE
While in the Scottish context investigators sought to make the mind an
object of empirical investigation and to discover its "physical laws" as a
prolegomena to morals, in Germany the science of the soul (or mind) was
treated as an autonomous discipline - or as a subdiscipline of the science
of Man - within the theoretical (as opposed to moral) sciences. The fram-
ers of "Seelenlehre", "Erfahrungsseelenlehre", and "empirische Psycho-
logie" aspired to such an empirical approach to the soul or mind. Early ins-
tances are found in the work of J. F. Abel and C. C. E. Schmid. Abel and
Schmid placed empirical psychology within natural science proper, distinct
from metaphysics; they considered psychology to be the branch of anthro-
pology or Menschenlehre that searches for the general laws of the mind
and its relation to the body ",
Abel's book exhibits a lypical psychological textbook organization, with
roots in the de anima lradition. After brief preliminary methodological
remarks, it considers first the nature of the mind, its basic powers and
organs, and especially its relation to the brain, and then it surveys in syste-
matic fashion the chief faculties of mind: sense, imagination, attention,
thought, feeling, and bodily motion. Throughout, Abel attempts to show
how all of the various powers and capacities of the mind can be reduced to
one basic power, the power of representation, and how the materials on
which the power of representation operates must all derive from sensory
ideas aroused through stimulation of the sense organs. As had become
common in the eighteenth century, he showed an interest in quantitative
measures where these were available; indeed, he gave quantitative values
27. A. FERGUSON. op. cit. supra n. 25, Introd., sec. 7; sec. 3.
28. Ibid., pt. 2, chap. 2, sec. I. .
29. Jacob Friedrich ABEL (Professor of Psychology and Morals at the Karlsschule), Ein-
leitung in die Seelenlehre,Stuttgart, Johann Benedikt Mezler, 1786, Einleitung; Carl Christian
Eberhard SCHMID (Professor of Philosophy, Jena), EmpirischePsychologie, 2nd ed., lena, Cro-
ker, 1796, p. 8. 11-12.
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for the "briefest still perceivable duration" of an impression on the sense
organs. But the primary theoretical interest of the work was the discovery
of "laws" governing the various faculties, including laws of association and
attention 30. The laws of attention assumed an all or none "conquest" (sie-
gen) of attention by one or another representation. Originally, the currently
liveliest or most pleasant representation wins out, but through experience it
may happen that a less lively or pleasant representation that has in the past
been followed by more pleasant representations will win out; the attentio-
nal faculty then comes to be guided by means-ends considerations in choo-
sing which representations to enhance through its own power.
Many of the topics in Abel's textbook, such as the perception of size,
shape, location, and distance, and attentional "conquest", can be found in
nineteenth- and in early and late twentieth-century textbooks. But one set
of questions would no longer be found after ca 1930 : those pertaining to
the existence and nature of the soul. The framers of Seelenlehre typically
argued that the soul is a separate substance from the body, and they did so
on philosophical as opposed to religious grounds. Abel repeated the widely
used argument that the unity of consciousness requires a unified substance
as its vehicle; but body is essentially conglomerate; hence, the simple
substance that is mind must be distinct from body. He took this argument
to be an exemple of empirical investigation. He divorced his investigation
from "metaphysical" considerations that transcend experience, e.g., about
mind-body interaction. Historians of psychology typically lump together
talk of a separate thinking substance and of mind-body interaction as
"metaphysics". Here, an eighteenth-century author asserts a different divi-
ding point. He holds that empirical considerations can be brought to bear
on the existence and nature of the soul. He does not mean that one can sim-
ply introspect and discover the simple substance of the soul. An argument
is required: a theoretical structure must be fit to the "data" of inner sense.
But he considered these questions on the soul to be empirically tractable,
by contrast with the problem of mind-body interaction, which admits of
multiple hypotheses that "save" the phenomena without differing empiri-
cally. He excluded the latter, empirically-undecidable problem from his
Seelenlehre 31•
Schmid drew the boundaries of the empirical more narrowly than had
Abel. He followed Kant in removing questions pertaining to the substantial-
ity and simplicity of the soul from the domain of empirical investigation
and relegating them to "dogmatic" metaphysics - for which he reserved
30. J. F. ABEL, op. cit. supra n. 29, § 148-163, 194-206.
31. Ibid., § 4-20.
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the names "transcendental" or "pure" psychology, or "pneumatology", the-
reby deviating from Kant's terminology. Included here were questions per-
taining to the independence, simplicity, personhood, spirituality, immutabi-
lity, and immortality of the soul, as well as those pertaining to its real
causal relation to body. He used the terms "empirical" and "rational" psy-
chology as Wolff had, to denote disciplines that are based directly on expe-
rience (or are a posteriori) and those that are based on the analysis of
concepts that themselves are drawn from experience (and hence are
"comparatively a priori")32, The rational part of psychology constructs
explanations for the empirical generalizations and other data collected in
the empirical part.
Having relegated the problem of the substantial nature of the mind to the
domain of dogmatic metaphysics, Schmid adopted a position of "empirical
dualism" 33. Empirical dualism distinguishes soul and body on the grounds
that the properties and phenomena revealed through outer and inner sense
cannot be united under a single set of concepts. Experience shows that the
phenomena of each are lawfully related. Empirical psychology charts law-
ful relations within the domain of soul, spirit, or mind, and between that
domain and bodily processes. Schmid's work is particularly impressive for
its detailed analytical treatment of psychological concepts informed by a
thorough acquaintance with the psychological, anthropological, and medi-
cal literatures.
EMPIRICALLY AND THEOREfICALLY PROGRESSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMS
According to the usual sociological measure of progressiveness, psycho-
logy was a progressive discipline during the eighteenth century: academic
appointments in psychology were made, courses were taught, the number
of textbooks published per decade increased, and, near the end of the cen-
tury, journals were founded (even if they failed within a decade)34. But I
would like to make a stronger claim for the progressiveness of various
eighteenth-century research programs that took a natural scientific attitude
toward the mind or mental phenomena. I propose as a working historical
thesis that eighteenth-eentury work made a threefold contribution to the
psychology of the nineteenth century. First, eighteenth-century faculty psy-
chology yielded a conceptual framework that was more fine-grained than
32. C. C. E. SCHMID, op. cit. supra n. 29. p. 18-26.
33. Ibid., p. 189-190.
34. These claims are supported by F. A. CARUS'S Geschichte, op. cit. supra n.6, and
C. C. E. SCHMID'S overview of the literature, op. cit. supra n. 29, p. 142-156.
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that of earlier centuries, and that benefited nineteenth-century investiga-
tions. Second, eighteenth-century association psychology provided the
theoretical framework that dominated much nineteenth-century psycho-
logy, the associationist framework. Third, eighteenth-century experimental
work, especially in vision, provided a tradition of experimental practice
that, although not often counted as part of "psychology" so called during
the eighteenth century, was incorporated into the "new" experimental disci-
pline of psychology during the nineteenth century. Further development of
the long-standing tradition of experimental work on vision provided the
primary foundation for the claims to found a new, experimental psycho-
logy.
A survey of that subset of popular late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century psychology textbooks that treat psychology as a natural science
would reveal that the structure of these books has much in common with
scholastic textbooks of the seventeenth century; the external senses, their
organs and associated nervous processes, are treated first; the "internal
senses" (usually not so called) are treated further on, including memory
and imagination; higher cognitive faculties, including reasoning, further
on; bodily motion, somewhere along the way; and appetite and will, near
the end 35. We can discover the specifically eighteenth-century contribution
by finding those new chapters in these textbooks that have origins in that
century. The new chapters include those on attention, conception or ab-
straction, and association. Attention was brought into psychology by the
faculty tradition, particularly by Wolff and his followers, and was further
addressed in Erfahrungsseelenlehre, which proposed empirical constraints
on the scope and direction of attention 36. The chapters on discrimination
and on conception or abstraction, though rooted in ancient Greek philo-
sophy, were introduced into eighteenth-century psychology books by those
developing the faculty approach 37. The added chapter on association was
due largely to attempts by authors such as Hume and Hartley to make the
laws of association the fundamental explanatory principles of mind3R•
35. W. JAMES, op. cit. supra n. I; Edward B. TITCHENER, Outline of Psychology, new ed.,
New YorklLondon, Macmillan, 1901; Hermann EBBINGHAUS, Abriss der Psycbologie, 4th ed.•
BerlinlLeipzig, Walter de Gruyter, 1912; Edward L. THORNDIKE, Elements of Psychology.
2nd ed.• New York. A. G. Seiler, 1915; W. WUNDT, Grundriss der Psychologie. 13thed.•
Leipzig. A. Kroner, 1918; H. A. CARR. op. cit. supra n. 1.
36. C. WOLFF. Psychologia empirica, op. cit. supra n. 14. pt. 1. sec. 3, chap. I. J. F. ABEL,
op. cit. supra n. 29. § 194-268. Nicolas MALEBRANCHE previously had placed attention at the
center of his discussion of method, Recherche de La verite, bk.6, pt. 2, in his (Euvres, ed.
Andre ROBINET. Paris, Vrin, 1958-1970, t, II.
37. C. WOLFF. Psychologia empirica, op. cit. supra n. 14, pt. I, sec. 3, chap. 1; Psycho-
logia rationalis, op. cit. supra n. 14, pI. 1, sec. I, chap. 4; J. F.ABEL, op. cit. supra n.29,
§ 392-436.
38. D. HUME, Treatise. op. cit. supra n. 26, bk. I, pt. I. sec.4; David HAR1UY, Observa-
tions on Man, London. S. Richardson. 1749. pt, I, chap. 1,prop. 10-14, and passim. C, WOLFF
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Thus far my analysis of the "progressive" tenor of eighteenth-century
psychology has been restricted to changes in psychological textbooks,
which mayor may not have claimed novel conceptual and theoretical
results, and which only sometimes claimed to present original observations.
One might concede that this older tradition contributed conceptual mate-
rials to the textbooks of the new psychology of the nineteenth century,
without accepting that the eighteenth century contributed to the rise of
experimental psychology. In fact, the strongest eighteenth-century contri-
bution to the rise of quantitative experimentation in psychology came from
the mixed-mathematical science of optics.
Optics was a "mathematical" science in virtue of its use of geometrical
constructions, especially in the tracing of "visual rays". As regards vision
proper, these rays were used in the analysis of the perception of size, shape,
distance, and motion. Mathematical (geometrical) regularities, such as that
among visual angle, apparent distance, and perceived size, were typically
expressed as proportions. There were few numerical values in optics
(indices of refraction being one). In the seventeenth century Descartes gave
estimates of the range within which accommodation and convergence
could provide accurate information for the perception of distance, though
he did not say how he had arrived at the values. Berkeley, who introduced
a conceptual revolution into the theory of vision with his doctrine of sug-
gestion, did not cite quantitative observational evidence.". The eighteenth
century was replete with novel observations of sensory phenomena, in-
cluding after-images and color blindness, that were not quantitative, but
were nonetheless important for that".
Nonetheless, there were quantitative studies of visual perception in the
eighteenth century, among which I give three examples. Patrick D' Arcy
measured the persistence of visual impressions by devising an apparatus
for presenting a luminous object (a live coal) to an observer with a circular
motion whose diameter, velocity, and distance from the observer could be
varied. By observing how rapidly the coal must tum in order to result in the
perception of a closed circle with constantly fixed gaze, he concluded that
described the phenomena of association and their law, Psychologia empiriea, op. cit. supra
n. 14, § 104, 117; his followerA. BAUMGARTEN named"associotio idearum" the "lex imagina·
tionis", op. cit. supra n. 17, § 561.
39. On Descartes and Berkeley, see Gary HATFIELD and William EPsTEIN, "The Sensory
Core and the Medieval Foundations of Early Modem Perceptual Theory", Isis, 70, 1979,
p.363-384.
40. On after-images, see Georges Louis LECLERC, comte de BUFPON, "Dissertation sur les
couleurs accidentelles", Mem. Acad. Sciences. 1743, Paris, 1746, p. 147-158. John DALTON,
"Extraordinary Facts Relating to the Vision of Colours: with Observations", Memoirs and
Proceedings of the Literary and Philosophical Society ofManchester. 5, 1798, p. 28-45.
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the impression lasts for "8 tierces" 41. Pierre Bouguer examined the ques-
tion of how lines must be rendered in perspective to yield an appearance of
being parallel, which was a problem addressed by several mathematical
theorists. He introduced into the problem the notion of the apparent (as
opposed to real) inclination of the ground plane, and measured the latter 42•
Robert Smith undertook a thorough study of the moon illusion, which he
explained in accordance with the hypothesis that for a given visual angle,
perceived size varies with apparent distance. He contended that the moon
appears larger at the horizon because it seems further away than when it is
overhead. In support of this hypothesis, he undertook to measure the per-
ceived curvature of the vault of the heavens, which informal observation
suggested is flattened. He obtained numerical values by comparing the
known position of the stars with the apparent bisections by visible stars of
the angle between the horizon and straight overhead 43.
The practice of seeking precise measurements in testing theories of per-
ception became more common in the nineteenth century, and was parti-
cularly highly developed in German sensory physiology and psychology.
Wundt and Helmholtz drew upon earlier work when they brought sensory
psychology into a position of scientific prominence, and not solely with
respect to experiment; equally or more importantly, their theoretical
conceptions were inherited from the highly developed theories of spatial
perception that arose in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 44.
CONCLUSIONS
Psychology or the science of the mind was conceived as a natural
science in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries all three.
The notions of psychology and natural science underwent significant
change along the way. At first "psychology" was the science of the Aris-
totelian soul, and covered vegetative as well as sensory and intellectual
41. Patrick D'Aacv, "Memoire sur la duree de la sensation de la vue", Mem. Acad.
Sciences, 1765, Paris, 1768, p.439-451.
42. Pierre BOUGUER, "Recherches sur la grandeur apparente des objets", Mem. Acad.
Sciences, 1755, Paris, 176I, p. 99-I I2.
43. Robert SMITH, Compleat System ofOpticks, Cambridge, printed for the author and sold
by C. Crownfield, 1738, t. I, p. 63-66. All three examples, along with others, are reported in
Joseph I'RIEsTLEY, History and Present State of Discoveries Relating to Vision, Light, and
Colours, London, 1. Johnson, 1772.
44. G. HATFIELD, The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from
Kant to Helmholtz, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1990, chap. 2,4, 5.
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powers; study of the latter, "cognitive" powers was a (dominating) sub-
discipline in Aristotelian psychology. Wolffians made psychology a part of
metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Scots placed psychology within
moral philosophy, but distinguished its "physical" laws from properly
moral laws (for guiding conduct). Several Germans sought to establish an
autonomous empirical psychology. Meanwhile, British and French visual
theorists developed sophisticated theories of spatial perception and mathe-
matically precise theories of size and distance perception; they created ins-
truments to test these theories. and to measure other visual phenomena,
such as the duration of visual impressions. Nearly all of these investigators
were dualists of one sort or another. From early to late, the trend was to
bracket metaphysical questions in favor of the search for empirical regula-
rities and empirically-based systems of classification. These empirical stu-
dies were directed at mental phenomena considered as distinct from mate-
rial phenomena.
This sketch of the early history of psychology challenges not only the
usual historiography, but also the usual conception of Enlightenment pro-
gress. In the standard narrative, the heroes of the Enlightenment are mate-
rialists. If psychology is to be made a science, the story goes, mind must be
equated with matter and thereby rendered subject to empirical investiga-
tion 4S. The problem is that no one bothered to tell the early practitioners of
natural scientific psychology that they had to be materialists in order to be
natural scientific psychologists. In point of fact, of all the major eighteenth-
century authors who made contributions to the development of psychology,
only Erasmus Darwin allowed that mind might be material; nineteenth-
century founders of psychology, including Wundt, Helmholtz, Lotze,
Ebbinghaus, James, Munsterburg, and Binet. banished the very question
from scientific psychology". These authors conceived psychology as natu-
ral scientific without seeing the need to adopt the metaphysical position of
materialism. In so doing, they would seem to be proceeding quite ratio-
nally, by studying what can be studied on its own terms and avoiding an
unnecessary commitment to the unsupported claim that mental phenomena
can be reduced to material processes. The old equation of Enlightenment
Reason with materialism turns out to have been so much prejudice. It
would be interesting to discover the historical conditions in which this ver-
sion of history became entrenched. In the meantime, there is much work to
45. S. SCHAFFER makes this position explicit, art. cit. supra n. 16, p. 240, 263.
46. Erasmus DARWIN, Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organic Llfe, London, J. Johnson, 1794,
t. I, p. 108-}()9. On anti- and non-materialistic stances in eighteenth and nineteenth-century
psychology (including Wundt, Helmholtz, and Lotze), see op. cit. supra n.44, chap. 6-7.
W. JAMES, op. cit. supra n. I, p. 6-7. Hugo MUNSTERBERG, Psychology: General and Applied,
New York/London, D. Appleton & Co., 1914,p. 39-42. Alfred BINET, Introduction ala psy-
chologie experimentale, Paris, F. Alcan, 1894, p. 146.
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be done investigating the history of psychology considered as the science
of mental phenomena, a history in which faculty psychology is no joke,
and in which materialism is virtually nowhere to be found.
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